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In contrast to the integral photograms of cinema, the images of a post-cinematic media 
regime are dividual, their forms discorrelated from molar subjectivity, their forces mo-
lecular, and their agencies of the order of metabolism rather than perception or cogni-
tion.1 It is in these terms that I have sought to understand the differences between cin-
ematic and post-cinematic media (Denson 2016), and I have thereby made appeal to a 
somewhat Deleuzian framework—essentially situating the post-cinematic image as a 
medium, vector, or agent of the control society, complicit in the dividuation and modula-
tion of subjects and their experiential and agential capacities under post-Fordist or ne-
oliberal capitalism, as suggestively described by Deleuze in his famous “Postscript on the 
Societies of Control” (1992). But what are the means and mechanisms by which discor-
related, “dividuated” images are supposed to affect us?2 
 
Substrate/Form 
To answer this question, I depart from Niklas Luhmann’s abstract concept of “mediality” 
as a model for conceiving a dynamic interplay between technical substrate and experien-
tial form and for re-focusing the temporal implications of dividual images’ diffuse but 
materially robust impact on experience (Luhmann 1997).  
 Mediality, for Luhmann, names not a particular apparatus but rather the relation 
between some substrate and the forms that can be constituted out of it. Accordingly, this 
way of thinking about mediality avoids a reductive identification of medium with appa-
ratic substrate; but because, according to Luhmann, substrate and form consist of the 
same basic elements—the same “stuff,” so to speak—this notion of mediality will not 
support an oppositional view whereby the technological or ontological realm is separat-
 
1 A much expanded version of this text will appear in Denson 2020 (forthcoming). There, I develop the 
concept of discorrelation across film and media-technical parameters (e.g. against the notion of “suture”) 
as well as philosophical coordinates (e.g. in contrast to the phenomenological “correlation” that Husserl 
[2012] theorizes and Meillassoux [2008] calls into question). For more general reflections on the concept 
of post-cinema, see Denson/Leyda 2016 and Shaviro 2010. 
2 In addition to Deleuze 1992, see also Ott 2018 and Raunig 2016 for further explorations of dividuality. 
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ed by an unbreachable gulf from a securely encapsulated phenomenological realm of 
experience. The difference between substrate and form is instead not a difference of 
kind but of organization: a substrate consists of a “loose coupling” of elements, a rela-
tively chaotic or unordered mass of particles, while forms emerge out of the substrate as 
the “tight” or strict couplings or combinations of the same elements. For example, more 
or less randomly distributed air molecules can be reordered into the forms of wave pat-
terns by a loudspeaker; the tones that present themselves as subjectively perceivable 
are themselves a substrate out of which music can be formed. There is a recursive link-
ing among media, such that the forms of one substrate come to constitute a higher-order 
substrate for other forms. Letters are a substrate for the forms of words, words a sub-
strate for sentences, sentences a substrate for larger textual forms, and so on. Thus, the 
substrate/form distinction is strictly relative: a medial substrate exists only in relation 
to the forms that it enables, and vice versa. A medium, on this view, is not objectively 
individuated as a thing-in-itself; rather, it is related to an observer or system as “the op-
erative deployment of the difference of medial substrate and form” (Luhmann 1997: 195; 
my translation).  
 The role of difference in this definition of mediality is crucial to the task of thinking 
dividuation—both of images and of experience—across the substrate/form divide.3 
While the difference of loose and tight couplings decisively undercuts a strictly opposi-
tional paradigm, whereby experience is ensconced behind a membrane impermeable to 
the image’s technological substrate, Luhmann’s view of media does not thereby revert to 
a correlative identification of substrate and form, such that every meaningful change in 
one would have an apparent effect on the other. Instead, difference remains as an essen-
tial and irreducible tension, thus providing a basis for thinking dividuality across the 
substrate/form divide. As I have put it elsewhere:  
Luhmann’s differential media concept thus bears a special relation to Gregory 
Bateson’s famous definition of information as a “difference that makes a differ-
ence.” Mediality is not just any difference but, we might say, the difference that 
makes the differences that make a difference—an information-generating and, 
more fundamentally, a system-structuring difference that orients by means of de-
fining the objects and structures that can count for a system, as well as specifying 
the elements of their composure. (Denson 2014: 314) 
Accordingly, the subjectivizing power of a dispositif, which produces its subject in rela-
tion not only to image-objects but also to the infrastructural substrate that supports 
them, is built into this conception as essential to it. For ultimately at stake in this defini-
tion of media is an environmental agency and its relation to systems as such. Luhmann 
 
3 Though I will not pursue it here, one could ask about the relations between Luhmann’s substrate/form 
distinction and Hjelmslev’s distinctions between “content” and “expression,” “substance” and “form,” as 
the latter inform Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “assemblage” (see Deleuze/Guattari 1987). 
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suggests at one point that his model of substrate/form provides an “alternative formula-
tion” of the environment/system distinction (1991: 121), thus implying that the inter-
play simply cannot be stabilized with reference to a subject, whose integrity is centrally 
at stake in the formation called “system.” A non-positivistic causality is implied: a trans-
ductive relation where the system or observer referenced in the definition of mediality 
as “the operative deployment” of the substrate/form difference does not transcendental-
ly stabilize but is itself constituted in relation to the interplay of these levels. In other 
words, it is precisely the subject (and its objects), for example the subjectivity of a spec-
tator, that is up for grabs at the intersection of substrate and form. Individuation follows 
from and does not precede the circulation of dividual materials. We are dealing here 
with the broadly environmental or metabolic processes that I have associated with dis-
correlated images. 
 Against a subjectivistic experientialism, experience is thus not “on the side” of form, 
as opposed to a technological substrate on “the other side”; rather, experience is precise-
ly that which is at issue in the difference between substrate and form. It is the ear (or the 
tympanic membrane) which is at stake in the articulation and disarticulation of sound 
waves; and it is the “ear” (or the aesthetic sensibilities) of the listening subject that is at 
stake in the articulation and disarticulation of music. What Luhmann refers to as the 
observer need not be a fully formed subject; in Peircean semiotics, it is called the “inter-
pretant.” The Luhmannian view, which emphasizes that substrate/form relations are 
always in flux, thus decenters focused perceptual experience; exchanges between sub-
strate and form express themselves less as perceptual objects than as intensities of tem-
poral synchronization. The ear’s tympanic membrane resonates in sync with the sound 
waves in the air; the listener’s educated “ear” is entrained by the sonic forms of music. 
This re-focusing of experiential intensity thus dislocates static conceptions of subjectivi-
ty (essentially spatialized conceptions that oppose subjects, dualistically, to their ob-
jects), thereby leveraging the ongoing modulation of subjectivity or experience, much 
like the modulation at stake in Deleuze’s control society. Through the repeated flux of 
formation and deformation, an ear or an eye becomes susceptible to training, a body 
becomes susceptible to habituation, and a mind becomes susceptible to education. Me-
diality is thereby reconfigured from a passive channel between fixed subjects and ob-
jects to become instead the site of affective attunements.  
 Emerging out of this perspective, as we see, is an essential reference to temporality. 
Mediality—as the site of interplay, flux, modulation, and attunement—is conceived as 
thoroughly processual: it is realized as the process of the coupling and decoupling of 
forms, which emerge from and return back into a substratal pool of disarticulation. 
These processes constitute patterns and rhythms that define nothing less than the tem-
porality or metabolism of a system. As irreducibly temporal formations, media in a sense 
“give” time to the structured organisms, psyches, and social units at stake in the for-
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mation of systems. Conceived along these lines, the metabolic agency of post-cinema’s 
dividual images is expressed in terms of a modulation of (pre-personal) temporality it-
self. And while this view is apparently at odds with ordinary concepts of what an image 
is—for example, the notion that it is a spatial-figural visual object rather than a primari-
ly temporal vector—a reconceptualization of images as temporal is in fact necessary in 
order to account for their circulation in today’s media.  
 The history of electronic images, in television, video cameras, and now computa-
tional systems, is a history of de-spatialization, as the photographic image was not only 
decomposed into smaller spatial units (dots and pixels), but recalculated and reconfig-
ured as a flux of frequencies—such as the frequency of phosphor illuminations by elec-
tron beams tracing alternating scanlines on the screens of cathode-ray tube televisions. 
Protocols such as NTSC and PAL redefined the image in terms of a subperceptual flux: 
the European PAL system temporalizes the image at the rate of 25 interlaced frames of 
video per second, the NTSC system at the rate of 29.97 frames. But far from simply ac-
celerating the frame rate of cinematic images, these electronic frames are fundamentally 
incomparable to the 24 frames per second of sound-era cinema. Interlaced video images 
are radically dividual in the sense that they are never fully present as integral units on 
the screen; instead, they are drawn by way of two “fields,” each consisting of several 
hundred scanlines, which are illuminated alternately: first all the even-numbered lines 
are consecutively illuminated, then all the odd-numbered ones. In the PAL system, which 
has 625 scanlines (only 576 of which are visible), this means that images do not appear 
as 25 full (or “cinematic”) frames per second but are instead dividuated at a frequency of 
50 Hertz—or 50 “fields” of 312.5 lines each per second, where each line is traversed at a 
speed of 64 microseconds. The afterglow of the phosphor coating activated at this rate 
makes the image appear more or less complete, but due to the phosphor’s short lumi-
nescence decay time, as well as the fact that the first field of the next frame will be 
drawn while the second field of the last frame is still visible, the image on the CRT screen 
is never stable or integrally individuated. The interlaced image, as a subperceptual 
“time-image,” is a fundamentally dividuated image. 
 Luhmann’s concept of substrate/form relations accounts perfectly for such images, 
which are formed according to precise temporal operations—or “time-critical process-
es,” as Wolfgang Ernst calls them—that tightly couple the elements (red, green, and blue 
phosphor dots or pixel strips) that compose the visible form of the image. Indeed, as we 
have seen, the image, which is no longer ever fully and singly “present,” fundamentally is 
the temporal flux or frequency that measures substrate/form exchanges. It is important 
to note, however, that such frequencies are measured only by the technical system, not 
by the viewer, for whom the impact is subperceptual and immune to subjective meas-
ure; as Jordan Schonig says in the context of compression glitches, this “movement is not 
measured by the spectator but immediately felt as an intensity” (2017: 221). Neverthe-
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less, the viewer does of course see images, but this fact must be seen as a byproduct of 
the temporalization of the image (even if such perception was the original and ultimate 
goal that led engineers to temporalize the image in this way—i.e. according to PAL, 
NTSC, and other protocols—in the first place). Thus, the viewer’s body must essentially 
resonate with the frequencies of the electronic image, be affectively attuned to it in or-
der for perception to take place; and indeed, many design decisions (concerning refresh 
rate, phosphor persistence, screen resolution, and the like) were made with the tempo-
ralities of bodily sensitivities in mind.  
 
Temporalization and Control 
But this reconceptualization of the image in terms of temporality is hardly inconsequen-
tial, as it opens the concept of “image” up to forms that would not be tuned thus to hu-
man perception. Indeed, by drawing on Luhmann’s abstract theory of mediality, we are 
compelled to reconceive the image quite apart from its visible or perceptible manifesta-
tions. This consequence will no doubt strike many readers as unacceptable, a veritable 
reductio ad absurdum. On the contrary, however, I claim this consequence precisely as a 
strength of the theory, in that it allows us to account for the embodied impact of imaging 
processes that do not have visible manifestations. What I have in mind here is not a phil-
osophical flight of fancy but instead concerns real-world applications that are very real, 
very concrete, and increasingly widespread. Media artist Trevor Paglen has termed 
these “invisible images”—images that circulate between machines, unseen by human 
eyes, in computer vision systems and artificial intelligence applications, in devices and 
platforms ranging from smartphones to satellites, Automatic License Plate Readers 
(ALPR) to social media networks (Paglen 2016). As Paglen puts it:  
over the last decade or so, something dramatic has happened. Visual culture has 
changed form. It has become detached from human eyes and has largely become 
invisible. Human visual culture has become a special case of vision, an exception to 
the rule. The overwhelming majority of images are now made by machines for oth-
er machines, with humans rarely in the loop. The advent of machine-to-machine 
seeing has been barely noticed at large, and poorly understood by those of us 
who’ve begun to notice the tectonic shift invisibly taking place before our very 
eyes. (2016: n.p.) 
Whether captured by a camera or generated synthetically, such “detached” or radically 
discorrelated—literally post-perceptual—images are not produced for human consump-
tion, but many of them are crucially involved in processes that are of no small concern to 
us: surveillance, logistics, industrial production, and the automation of various other 
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The landscape of invisible images and machine vision is becoming evermore active. 
Its continued expansion is starting to have profound effects on human life, eclips-
ing even the rise of mass culture in the mid 20th century. Images have begun to in-
tervene in everyday life, their functions changing from representation and media-
tion, to activations, operations, and enforcement. Invisible images are actively 
watching us, poking and prodding, guiding our movements, inflicting pain and in-
ducing pleasure. But all of this is hard to see. (2016: n.p.) 
Even if they are invisible, such images are undeniably real and materially consequen-
tial—they can be matters, literally, of life and death. Consider, for example, the invisible 
images that a self-driving car generates (with a set of smart cameras, radar, and LIDAR 
systems) and then processes (starting in-camera, applying geometrical transformations, 
video compression, and edge detection preprocessing before streaming the signals to 
other processing units), all without the intervention of a human perceiver. Indeed, it is 
the human passenger whose continued existence, much less perception, is precisely at 
stake in these microtemporal operations. Or consider the very similar processes taking 
place in autonomous military drones, where the automated capture and analysis of in-
visible images is directed not towards the preservation but the annihilation of life. Cru-
cial to these operations is the discorrelated image, the dis-integrity and dividuality of 
which is a function of its ever-accelerating temporalization, and vice versa. In such 
forms, post-cinematic images become vectors of control at the broadest scale. 
 Again, I am drawn to Luhmann’s concept of mediality because it enables us to ac-
count for such processes in which discorrelation and dividuality, far from marking the 
impossibility of having an impact on human experience, are instead coupled with clear 
and sweeping consequences, hence aligning dividuated images with the modulating pro-
cesses of Deleuze’s control society. But it is not just the paradoxically spectacular-yet-
invisible images of drone warfare and expensive cars that play a role here. In between 
the CRT’s still relatively perceptible images and the strictly invisible images of neural 
nets, we are hailed everywhere today by digital screens and their dividual images. These 
too, I suggest, are part of the mundane machinery of control. Recognizing them as such 
requires that we understand the interplay of pre-perceptual intensity, temporal syn-
chronization, and embodied habituation at work in the images that circulate on the ma-
jority of our screens today: whether flatscreen TVs, LCD computer monitors, or 
handheld devices like tablets and smartphones. Seen in this light, we can more fully ap-
preciate the pre-personal impact that the dividualities of computationally processed 
images, as a matter of their sheer environmental presence and quite apart from their 
drawing attention to themselves as individuated perceptual objects, can have on us. 
Again, situating dividuation precisely at the difference of substrate and form, rather than 
sacrificing this difference to either an oppositional or a correlative model that would 
cordon technological operations off from experience or raise them up to the level of per-
ception, will allow us to see dividuated images as agents of everyday control: vectors of 
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temporal modulation operating at the level of environmental metabolism rather than 
perception or cognition.  
 As in the case of the interlaced video image on the CRT, the interplay of substrate 
and form in a digital display device implies new forms of temporality, only further dis-
correlated from human subjectivity—which is selectively, optionally, and if at all, then 
only temporarily given access to the new images. According to Paglen: 
What’s truly revolutionary about the advent of digital images is the fact that they 
are fundamentally machine-readable: they can only be seen by humans in special 
circumstances and for short periods of time. A photograph shot on a phone creates 
a machine-readable file that does not reflect light in such a way as to be perceptible 
to a human eye. A secondary application, like a software-based photo viewer 
paired with a liquid crystal display and backlight may create something that a hu-
man can look at, but the image only appears to human eyes temporarily before re-
verting back to its immaterial machine form when the phone is put away or the 
display is turned off. (2016: n.p.) 
The temporary appearance of the image is a consequence of the specific temporality of 
an image which, in principle, could remain invisible to the human; this temporality is 
determined by the interplay of substrate and form (the process by which the image “ap-
pears” briefly before “reverting back” to the invisible substrate). The time that is proper 
to such images is the superfast time of computational microtemporality, wholly discor-
related from the temporal window of human perception. To become visible, the image 
must be brought inside that window through mechanisms (LCDs and LEDs, etc.) that 
correspond to our embodied receptivity. The point, however, is that the image is—at the 
outset, and in principle—invisible due to the temporal mismatch between computation-
al and human temporal processing; visibility is optional and ancillary with respect to the 
more fundamental state of invisibility.  
 Paglen emphasizes, however, that even when such images remain invisible, they are 
capable of shaping or modulating experience, effectively setting the parameters for it as 
the environment within which we live. For example, Facebook and Instagram present 
themselves as places to share photos with friends and family, suggestively offering “al-
bums” in which to store related images (photos from your last vacation, for example). 
But, as Paglen shows, “the analogy is deeply misleading”: “When you put an image on 
Facebook or other social media, you’re feeding an array of immensely powerful artificial 
intelligence systems information about how to identify people and how to recognize 
places and objects, habits and preferences, race, class, and gender identifications, eco-
nomic statuses, and much more” (2016: n.p.). In other words, the invisible substrate is 
where the action’s really at, while human perception is secondary at best. 
Regardless of whether a human subject actually sees any of the 2 billion photo-
graphs uploaded daily to Facebook-controlled platforms, the photographs on social 
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media are scrutinized by neural networks with a degree of attention that would 
make even the most steadfast art historian blush. Facebook’s “DeepFace” algo-
rithm, developed in 2014 and deployed in 2015, produces three-dimensional ab-
stractions of individuals’ faces and uses a neural network that achieves over 97 
percent accuracy at identifying individuals—a percentage comparable to what a 
human can achieve, ignoring for a second that no human can recall the faces of bil-
lions of people. (Paglen 2016: n.p.) 
Meanwhile, the consequences of this substratal action can be very concrete: 
As governments seek out new sources of revenue in an era of downsizing, and as 
capital searches out new domains of everyday life to bring into its sphere, the abil-
ity to use automated imaging and sensing to extract wealth from smaller and 
smaller slices of everyday life is irresistible. It’s easy to imagine, for example, an AI 
algorithm on Facebook noticing an underage woman drinking beer in a photo-
graph from a party. That information is sent to the woman’s auto insurance pro-
vider, who subscribes to a Facebook program designed to provide this kind of data 
to credit agencies, health insurers, advertisers, tax officials, and the police. Her au-
to insurance premium is adjusted accordingly. A second algorithm combs through 
her past looking for similar misbehavior that the parent company might profit 
from. In the classical world of human-human visual culture, the photograph re-
sponsible for so much trouble would have been consigned to a shoebox to collect 
dust and be forgotten. In the machine-machine visual landscape the photograph 
never goes away. It becomes an active participant in the modulations of her life, 
with long-term consequences. (Paglen 2016: n.p.) 
I have quoted at length from Paglen’s descriptions of this landscape of invisible images 
because they get at something essential about the contemporary interplay between sub-
strate and form—i.e. the processes of flux that “give” time today to humans (and, given 
the planetary reach of our technologies, possibly to life on Earth more generally). The 
temporalization and dividuation of contemporary images, as we see, gives rise to meta-
bolic forces that are reshaping the very pathways of exchange (input/output, percep-
tion/action, consumption/production, digestion/excretion, etc.) within the general ecol-
ogy of contemporary biotechnical existence.  
 And while all of this may seem quite distant from the act of watching movies, for 
example, it is increasingly hard to draw a line: when we stream videos from Netflix, Am-
azon Prime, Hulu, or YouTube, for example, we are providing valuable information to 
these companies that, while it may not be used against us in the way that Paglen imagi-
nes above, will certainly be monetized and re-cycled back into the larger ecology. This 
might be in the form of paid advertisements, recommendations for other videos that will 
keep us in the circuits of attention and invisible data-exchange, or even for the purposes 
of content-generation: Netflix has famously used viewing information to make decisions 
about original content production and funding, while YouTube infamously enabled a 
perverse ecology of algorithmically generated content directed at young, often preverb-
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al, children locked into the “Up Next” autoplay circuit on their parents’ iPads—with vid-
eos featuring their favorite cartoon characters being tortured, vomiting, or showing up 
in creepy situations wholly inappropriate for the target audience (Bridle 2017). Mean-
while, even apparently non-networked video consumption is hard to keep out of these 
circuits: our smart TVs, BluRay players, and videogame consoles relay information back 
to their parent companies about the type of content we make visible on our screens, 
whether they come from cable TV, from an optical disk, or are stored on an external 
hard drive. Here, again, we see that the visible forms of digital images are just the tip of 
the iceberg, and that their invisible substrates implicate them in diffuse and far-reaching 
ecologies of experience and control. 
 Above all, what emerges in this view is that, across scales, the dividuation of the im-
age is bound up with the dividuation of experience. Most centrally at stake in these op-
erations, in the interplay and flux of substrate and form, is temporalization or the modu-
lation of time itself. The image today is not a primarily visible object but an always spe-
cific binding of time, whether in relation to human perception or computational mi-
crotemporality. Dividualization is itself a fundamentally temporal control process, con-
cerned with an ever more fine-grained division of time and the operationalization of the 
smallest available temporal units. Paglen refers to “the ability to use automated imaging 
and sensing to extract wealth from smaller and smaller slices of everyday life” (2016: 
n.p.), or again: “Smaller and smaller moments of human life are being transformed into 
capital” (2016: n.p.). My point about dividuated images is that they are crucial mediators 
of this process, as they serve to bind human attention and time more generally to the 
microtemporal circuits of the planetary control systems that would seem to have us 
locked into a global death spiral, on a collision course with extinction. Surprisingly, then, 
confronting this horizon of a future without future may require us to step back from 
specifically futuristic fantasies of terraforming Mars and the like, and instead to focus on 
the more mundane present of watching movies. For it is here, on these screens, that the 
future is being plotted in increasingly anticipatory processes that materially displace the 
perceptual present and seek in advance to format the subject of experience, to modulate 
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